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After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
United States government began to use drones against al-Qaeda 
targets.  According to several media reports, the United States 
developed two parallel drone programs: one operated by the 
military, and one operated in secrecy by the CIA.  Under the 
Obama Administration, the latter program developed and the 
number of drone attacks in countries such as Pakistan and 
Yemen has steadily increased.  Because the drone program is 
operated covertly by the CIA, it has been impossible to 
determine the precise contours of the program, its legal and 
normative framework, and whether its operators have been 
lawfully implementing the program.  This article focuses on four 
distinct issues linked to the United States’ use of drones: the 
definition of the battlefield and the applicability of the law of 
armed conflict; the identity of targetable individuals and their 
status as combatants or civilians under international law; the 
legality of targeted killings under international humanitarian 
law; and the location and status of drone operators.  This 
article concludes that the Obama Administration, as well as any 
future administrations, should consider installing military-led 
drone operations, which would be subject to public scrutiny to 
ensure that the rule of law remains the guiding principle of the 
United States’ use of force abroad. 
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I. Introduction and Background on the Use of 
Drones 
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President George W. Bush, in 
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, authorized the use of drones 
against leaders of al-Qaeda forces, pursuant to Congress’ 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).1 Pursuant to 
AUMF, drones could be utilized against al-Qaeda forces to target or 
to kill enemies. It has been reported that the United States possesses 
two types of drones: smaller ones, which predominantly carry out 
surveillance missions, and larger ones, which can carry hellfire missiles 
and have been used to conduct strikes and targeted killings.2 Drone 
strikes have been carried out by both the military as well as the CIA. 
As Jane Mayer famously noted in her article:  
The U.S. government runs two drone programs. The military’s 
version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the 
recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets 
enemies of U.S. troops stationed there. As such, it is an 
extension of conventional warfare. The C.I.A.’s program is 
aimed at terror suspects around the world, including in 
countries where U.S. troops are not based.3  
1. S. J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted). This article, perhaps 
regrettably, does not examine issues related to AUMF, to the legality of 
the drone program under AUMF, or any constitutional issues linked to 
the exercise of broad military powers by the executive branch. 
Moreover, this article utilizes the term “drone.” Other terms used in 
academic debate include “unmanned aerial vehicles” and “remotely-
piloted aircraft.” While the latter two may be more technologically 
accurate, this article adopts the popular term “drone.”  
2. See Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 104 (2010). 
3. Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s 
Covert Drone Program?, THE NEW YORKER,  http://www.newyorker.co 
m/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer (Oct. 26, 2009). 
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Moreover, although the President had designated Afghanistan and 
its airspace as a combat zone, the United States has used drones in 
other areas of the world, such as Yemen, where al-Qaeda forces have 
been targeted and killed.4 In fact, the U.S. approach for the use of 
drones is that members of al-Qaeda forces may be targeted anywhere 
in the world: that the battlefield follows those individuals who have 
been designated as enemies due to their affiliation with al-Qaeda.5 
While many in the international community have criticized the 
United States’ expansive geographical use of drones against al-Qaeda 
forces,6 officials in the Bush Administration have defended the drone 
program as consistent and conforming to international law.7 President 
Obama has continued this approach and has expanded the use of 
drones in the war on terror.8 Moreover, high-level officials in the 
Obama Administration have offered detailed legal justifications for 
the legality of the American drone program.  
Harold Koh, State Department Legal Advisor, justified the use of 
drones at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting 
on March 25, 2010, arguing “it is the considered view of this 
Administration . . . that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal 
operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, 
comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.”9 In his 
speech, Koh cited both domestic law (AUMF) and international law 
as proof that the United States is engaged in armed conflict with al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, and “associated forces.”10 Targeted killings, 
according to Koh, are justified because they are performed in 
4. Michael W. Lewis & Vincent J. Vitkowsky, The Use of Drones and 
Targeted Killing in Counterterrorism, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y 
PRAC. GROUPS 73, 73 (2011). 
5. See id. (noting that under this approach, “al Qaeda terrorists who 
continue to plot attacks may, in appropriate circumstances, be lawful 
subjects of armed attack without regard to their location”). 
6. One of the most vocal critics of the drone program has been Professor 
Mary Ellen O’Connell. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Remarks, The 
Resort to Drones Under International Law, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 585, 592 (2010). See also Hina Shamsi, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and the Modern Challenges to Use of Force Law, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 161, 166–68 (2010) (demanding the United States provide a 
detailed analysis to the general public justifying its killings abroad).  
7. See Lewis & Vitkowsky, supra note 4, at 74.  
8. Id. at 73. 
9. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 14, 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/179305.pdf 
(Mar. 25, 2010). 
10. Id. 
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accordance with the laws of war.11 In other words, the United States 
conducts targeted strikes consistent with the well-known principles of 
distinction and proportionality to ensure that the targets are 
legitimate and collateral damage minimized.12 
Koh offered four reasons supporting the legality of targeted drone 
killings. First, enemy leaders are legitimate targets because they are 
belligerent members of an enemy group in a war with the United 
States.13 Second, drones can constitute appropriate instruments for 
such missions, so long as their use conforms to the laws of war.14 
Third, enemy targets are selected through “robust” procedures; as 
such, they require no legal process and are not “unlawful 
extrajudicial” killings.15 Finally, Koh argued that using drones to 
target “high level belligerent leaders” does not violate domestic law 
banning assassinations.16 
The Obama Administration has continued to use drones in 
Pakistan, as well as in Yemen. Increasingly, however, the American 
drone program has been run by the CIA.17 Leon Panetta, the CIA 
Director, has praised the drone program stating that drones were “the 
only game in town.”18 On September 30, 2011, a CIA-operated drone 
targeted and killed an American citizen in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki.19 
Al-Awlaki had been accused of holding prominent roles within the 
ranks of al-Qaeda and had been placed on a hit list, authorized by 
President Obama.20 His assassination marked the first time in history 
an American citizen had been targeted abroad without any judicial 
involvement or proceedings to determine guilt of any crime. 
In a subsequent speech, Attorney General Eric Holder confirmed 
the Obama Administration’s view on the legality of targeted killings, 
including killings of American citizens. On March 5, 2012, in a speech 
at Northwestern University, Holder claimed targeted killings of 
American citizens are legal if the targeted citizen is located abroad, a 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 15.  
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. See Mayer, supra note 3. 
18. U.S. Air Strikes in Pakistan Called “Very Effective,” CNN, http://ww 
w.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/j(Mayj18,  
2009, 6:48 PM). 
19. Al Qaeda’s Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, CBS, http://www.cbs 
news.com/2100-202_162-20113732.html (Sept. 30, 2011, 1:22 PM). 
20. See Lewis & Vitkowsky, supra note 4, at 75.  
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senior operational leader of al-Qaeda or associated forces, actively 
engaged in planning to kill Americans, poses an imminent threat of 
violent attack against the United States (as determined by the U.S. 
government), and cannot be captured; such operations must be 
conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war 
principles.21  
Despite Koh’s and Holder’s justifications, many have questioned 
the legality of the American use of drones to perform targeted killings 
of al-Qaeda members and of U.S. citizens. Philip Alston, UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, has 
famously stated his concerns that drones “are being operated in a 
framework which may well violate international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.”22 This article highlights some of the 
most relevant issues surrounding the (il)legality of targeted killings 
under the current approach of the Obama Administration. This 
article concludes that most targeted killings are illegal under 
international law; only a very small number of such killings, 
performed under carefully crafted circumstances, could potentially 
comply with the relevant rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and 
only if one accepts the premise that the United States is engaged in 
an armed conflict against al-Qaeda. This article discusses the 
following issues related to the use of drones to perform targeted 
killings: the definition of the battlefield and the applicability of the 
law of armed conflict (Part II); the identity of targetable individuals 
and their status as combatants or civilians under international law 
(Part III); the legality of targeted killings under international 
humanitarian law (Part IV); and the location and status of drone 
operators (Part V). 
II. What and Where is the Battlefield? Which Laws 
Apply? 
Under the Bush Administration approach, the United States post 
9/11 was engaged in a global war against terrorists. Under this 
expansive approach, the war had no geographic constraints, and the 
battlefield was of a global nature.23 In other words, the war followed 
21. See Eric Holder, Attorney General., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Speech at 
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-
1203051.html. 
22. US Warned on Deadly Drone Attacks, BBC,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/8329412.stm (Oct. 28, 2009, 5:40 PM).  
23. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 6, at 595 (noting that under the Bush 
Administration approach, “we could kill al Qaeda members if they were 
in the U.S., Germany, Switzerland, and elsewhere based on a suspect’s 
presence”). 
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the terrorist enemies, and wherever they were located was where the 
battlefield could be temporarily situated. According to the Bush 
Administration, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court case Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the United States was at war against al-Qaeda and Taliban 
forces, and the applicable laws were the laws of war.24 Thus, military 
force, including the use of drones, could be used if consistent with the 
laws of war.  
Under the Obama Administration, the rhetoric has slightly 
changed: the United States is no longer engaged in a global war on 
terror but rather, in a war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
associated forces.25 However, the Obama Administration, by 
conducting drone strikes in a variety of locations, including Pakistan 
and Yemen, has followed the Bush Administration view of the global 
battlefield. The Obama Administration believes, like the Bush 
Administration, that the laws of war apply to the use of drone strikes 
because the United States is engaged in an armed conflict.26 Moreover, 
the Obama Administration has claimed drones can be used in 
countries that harbor terrorist enemies and are unwilling or unable to 
control territory where such enemies are located.27 This rationale 
would likely exclude places like England and France from the possible 
definition and localization of the battlefield, but would purport to 
justify the use of drones in places like Pakistan and Yemen, where 
remote territories are hard to control and where central governments 
cannot claim to possess effective control.28  
24. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 2, at 107 (noting that “the Executive 
Branch has consistently characterized the current conflicts to be armed 
conflicts, governed primarily by the lex specialis of the laws of war” in 
both the Bush and Obama Administrations); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006) (characterizing the conflict with al-Qaeda as 
armed conflict to which the laws of war apply); see also Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–
19 (2004). 
25. See Koh, supra note 9, at 13–15 (identifying al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
associated forces as targets of U.S. operations).  
26. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 107. 
27. Koh, supra note 9, at 14 (noting that the decision of “whether a 
particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend 
upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the 
imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, 
and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the 
target poses”). 
28. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 2, at 130–33 (discussing the location of the 
strikes, concluding that strikes can most likely be lawfully conducted in 
places of “hot conflict” like Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, but 
questioning whether the United States would ever opt for strikes in 
more neutral places such as Kenya, the Philippines, or Saudi Arabia). 
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The above described terminology (“global war on terror” and 
“war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces”) is vastly 
important, as it designates the applicable legal framework surrounding 
targeted killings and drone strikes. If one accepts the premise that the 
United States is engaged in armed conflict against al-Qaeda terrorists, 
then one has to conclude that laws of war apply.29 If laws of war 
apply, then the rules of jus ad bellum determine whether military 
force is utilized in a lawful way. In fact, laws of war permit targeted 
killings if two particular requirements of jus ad bellum are satisfied: 
the use of force is necessary and the use of force is proportionate.  
First, a state resorting to force must prove its decision to resort to 
force was a result of an armed attack and necessary to respond to 
such attack.30 It is possible to argue that al-Qaeda’s campaign of 
terrorist attacks against the United States, including 9/11, 
corresponded to an armed attack. However, it is also possible to argue 
that “al Qaeda’s campaign against the United States does not trigger 
the right of self-defensive force . . . because al Qaeda has not launched 
a full scale military offensive.”31 Another difficulty in this context is 
that al-Qaeda is not a state, and under traditional international law, 
only states could initiate armed attack against states, thus triggering 
the right to self-defense.32 While some commentators have argued that 
the use of force in self-defense against a non-state actor should be 
29. An additional inquiry here is whether the United States is engaged in an 
international armed conflict, or in an internal armed conflict against al-
Qaeda. International armed conflicts are governed by the 1907 Hague 
Conventions, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, customary law, and 
the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Non-
international armed conflicts are governed by Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, custom, domestic law, and the second Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Some have even suggested the 
existence of a third category of internationalized non-international 
armed conflicts. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see 
Vogel, supra note 2, at 110–14. This inquiry goes beyond the scope of 
this article; moreover, this inquiry is not dispositive of the issues posed 
by this article, which will refer to all of the above-mentioned 
conventions. It should be noted that the Obama Administration has 
taken the position that the United States is engaged in a non-
international armed conflict against al-Qaeda, Taliban, and their 
associated forces. See Koh, supra note 9, at 12. 
30. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 196–200 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua case]. 
31. Andrew C. Orr, Note, Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The 
Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under International Law, 
44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 729, 737 (2011). 
32. Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self-Defense, Operation 
Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 
9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77, 93–94 (2010). 
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permissible, “[i]n an era where non-state groups project military-scale 
power,”33 this view remains controversial.34  
Second, a state resorting to the use of force must prove its use of 
force was proportionate to the military campaign’s objective.35 The 
proportionality test of jus ad bellum should “be applied contextually, 
to determine whether the overall goal of a use of force . . . is a 
proportionate objective.”36 Because the CIA operates the drone 
program in Pakistan in secrecy, it is impossible to determine 
conclusively whether the program meets the proportionality 
requirement of jus ad bellum. It is possible to argue the resort to 
targeted killings through the use of drones is at least sometimes 
necessary and proportionate (for example, when a U.S. military 
commander possesses information that a high-value al-Qaeda 
operative, engaged in planning armed attacks against Americans, is 
located in a specific location which is relatively easily reachable via 
drones, and  the commander decides that neutralization of the al-
Qaeda target is necessary to prevent attacks against Americans). It is 
probable that many drone strikes do not meet the requirements of jus 
ad bellum, but it is nonetheless difficult to conclude, under this 
approach, that the entire drone program is per se illegal. Should the 
U.S. government—specifically the CIA—release more facts regarding 
the drone program, it may become plausible to assess the lawfulness 
of this type of force through the jus ad bellum prism.  
If, however, one rejects the conclusion that the United States is 
engaged in armed conflict, then the legality of the entire drone 
program becomes questionable. One could logically conclude the 
United States is not fighting a true war, but chasing terrorists. Under 
this view, the law of armed conflict would no longer apply, and the 
United States could use force against such terrorists only under a law 
enforcement paradigm—only when the use of force is absolutely 
necessary. Moreover, if the laws of war do not apply, then 
international human rights law dictates that targeted killings are legal 
only if a threat imminent and the reaction necessary, because under 
human rights law, “it is never permissible for killing to be the sole 
33. Orr, supra note 31, at 739. 
34. For one of the leading opponents of the view that al-Qaeda forces, as a 
non-state actor, can launch an armed attack within the meaning of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter (self-defense), see Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–
2009, at 13 (Notre Dame L. Sch., Research Paper No. 09–43, 2010). 
35. For a detailed analysis of the proportionality test under jus ad bellum, 
see Nicaragua case, supra note 30, ¶¶ 194, 237. 
36. Orr, supra note 31, at 738 (quoting Robert D. Sloan, The Cost of 
Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in 
the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE INT’L L. 47, 69 (2010)). 
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objective of an operation.”37 “[A] killing is only legal to prevent a 
concrete and imminent threat to life, and, additionally, if there is no 
other non-lethal means of preventing that threat to life.”38 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
prohibits “arbitrary” killing, as well as punitive or deterrent killings of 
terrorists.39 The very nature of the American drone program, where 
targeted killings are utilized to neutralize al-Qaeda operatives, even 
though such killings are not absolutely necessary, is contrary to 
international human rights law. Under this paradigm, one must 
conclude that the drone program is illegal.  
III. Who Are the Targets? 
The second question related to the use of drones has to do with 
the targets themselves: who can be targeted and under what 
circumstances? This issue depends on the above-mentioned inquiry 
about the nature of the conflict with al-Qaeda. If the United States is 
engaged in an armed conflict and the laws of war apply, then lawful 
combatants can be targeted, unless they have surrendered and are 
hors de combat.40 Lawful combatants are defined in the Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
37. Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, ¶ 33, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010). 
38. Sebastian Wuschka, The Use of Combat Drones in Current Conflicts—
A Legal Issue or a Political Problem?, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 891, 
898 (2011). 
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(1), Dec. 19, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Israel, ¶ 15, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003) (discussing the 
committee’s concerns with targeted killings). 
40. See Wuschka, supra note 38, at 898; see also Lewis & Vitkowski, supra 
note 4, at 73 (noting that combatants may not be targeted if they are 
hors de combat). Another relevant and interesting issue raised by the 
rule that combatants may not be targeted if they are hors de combat 
can be illustrated by the following hypothetical: what if al-Qaeda 
combatants (in the true sense of the word) are targeted by a drone 
strike attempt to surrender, by waving a white flag a few seconds after 
they realize that they are being pursued by a drone? Is the drone 
operator under a legal obligation to abort the targeting operation 
because the combatants are no longer engaged in combat? To the extent 
that drone technology does not allow for this outcome, because the 
drone operator at that point no longer possesses the capability to halt 
the operation, do drones become unlawful weapons? This question 
remains outside the scope of this article but will hopefully remain the 
subject of many academic debates and scholarly writings in the future.  
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as all members of the armed forces of a state party to a conflict.41 In 
fact, under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, lawful 
combatants are either members of a state’s armed forces or militia, 
report to a responsible chain of command, distinguish themselves by 
wearing distinctive signs or uniforms, carry arms openly, or conduct 
their actions in compliance with the laws and customs of war.42 
Individuals who do not qualify as lawful combatants are civilians and 
may never be targeted.43  
Under the laws of war, al-Qaeda members can be targeted if they 
qualify as lawful combatants; if not, then they are civilians and are 
protected from military strikes. If one accepts the premise that the 
United States is engaged in armed conflict, then one should logically 
have to conclude that al-Qaeda members are lawful combatants—
otherwise, the characterization of the conflict as true war makes little 
sense. After all, the United States cannot be the only true warrior in 
the armed conflict against al-Qaeda. This conclusion is easily 
reachable if one adopts a looser interpretation of the Geneva 
Conventions by recognizing that in most modern-day wars members 
of armed forces do not always wear uniforms and carry arms openly. 
Unlike World War II, modern-day wars are fought by armies and 
militias that may appear civilian and may not resemble traditional 
soldiers. Nonetheless, some have adopted a strict interpretation of the 
Geneva Conventions and advanced the idea that al-Qaeda members 
are civilians because they do not possess the above-mentioned 
characteristics of true soldiers under the laws of war.44  
Civilians can only be targeted if they participate directly in the 
hostilities.45 The requirements of direct participation in hostilities are 
not elaborated upon in either the Geneva Conventions or the 
Additional Protocols. However, these requirements have been 
discussed at length in a study by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and in Israeli Supreme Court case law.46 According 
41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), art. 43(2), Jan. 23 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol I]. 
42. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 
4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention III]. 
43. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51(3).  
44. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 2, at 119 (concluding that “[m]embers of al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associates do not meet the requirements 
of lawful combatancy, and therefore are unlawful combatants or 
unprotected civilians” (footnote omitted)). 
45. See Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51(3). 
46. See Wuschka, supra note 38, at 899. 
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to the ICRC study, direct participation contemplates a specific act, 
and civilians lose protection against direct attacks as long as they are 
participating in such specific hostile acts.47 To the contrary, members 
of an armed group remain direct participants in the hostilities for the 
entire duration of their membership in the given armed group, 
because of their constant combat function.48 Under the ICRC 
approach, al-Qaeda members could be targeted only if one could 
prove that particular targets were directly engaged in the hostilities. 
This view would seriously restrict the choice of targets and shed 
further doubt on the legality of the entire drone program. Under the 
Israeli Supreme Court approach, however, the relevant inquiry is 
“whether civilians are performing the function of combatants.”49 
Civilians who only perform sporadic hostile acts are entitled to 
protection from direct attacks once they detach themselves from such 
acts. However, permanent members of terrorist groups lose their 
civilian status and protection.50 Based on the Israeli Supreme Court 
view, members of al-Qaeda could be targeted because they would 
have lost civilian status through their membership in a terrorist 
organization. While some scholars have supported this view, many 
others have criticized it, and it is fair to assert that this view has not 
reached unanimous approval in the international community. 
Thus, if al-Qaeda members were considered civilians, they could 
be targeted only if they participate directly in the hostilities; this 
requirement has not been conclusively defined in international law 
and each targeting operation would have to be carefully analyzed to 
determine whether a particular individual could be targeted. It should 
be noted that the Obama Administration has argued that individuals 
who are part of an armed group are “belligerents and, therefore, 
lawful targets under international law.”51 The Obama Administration 
has seemingly rejected the ICRC approach and adopted a more 
aggressive tactic in determining which individuals can be targeted.  
In addition to the debate over the status of al-Qaeda forces as 
combatants versus civilians, some have advanced the idea that 
members of al-Qaeda are unlawful combatants—that they do not 
47. See NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 43–46 (2009). 
48. See id. at 31–36 (discussing various criteria for membership in armed 
groups). 
49. Helen Keller and Magdalena Forowicz, A Tightrope Walk Between 
Legality and Legitimacy: An Analysis of the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
Judgment on Targeted Killing, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 185, 207 (2008). 
50. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel 
53(4)PD 817, ¶ 39 [2005] (Isr.).  
51. Koh, supra note 9, at 15. 
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qualify as lawful combatants because they do not fight pursuant to 
the rules of the laws of war, but that they do not qualify as civilians 
either precisely because they are engaged in a fight against the United 
States.52 According to Yoram Dinstein,  
[A] person is not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the 
hat of a civilian and the helmet of a soldier. A person who 
engages in military raids by night, while purporting to be an 
innocent civilian by day, is neither a civilian nor a lawful 
combatant. He is an unlawful combatant. He is a combatant in 
the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the enemy, but he 
cannot claim the privileges appertaining to lawful combatancy. 
Nor does he enjoy the benefits of civilian status . . . .53 
Under this view, members of al-Qaeda could be targeted, because 
they are not civilians, but would not enjoy the protections the law of 
war offers to lawful combatants. This view has not been immune to 
criticism.54 Moreover, this view appears asymmetrical and almost 
unfair: on the one hand, it asserts that forces like al-Qaeda may be 
liberally targeted as combatants, while on the other hand dictating 
that they be deprived of any protections derived through combatant 
status. Yoram Dinstein may be correct in his description of persons 
who wear “two caps,” but many would dispute his assertion that such 
a person is neither civilian nor combatant. A better view may be to 
either classify members of al-Qaeda as combatants or as civilians 
participating directly in hostilities.  
If one rejects the conclusion that the United States is engaged in 
armed conflict against al-Qaeda, then any forceful action against al-
Qaeda targets would have to be analyzed through a law enforcement 
paradigm and international human rights law would apply. Under this 
approach, individuals could not be targeted unless the threat the 
individuals pose is imminent and the targeting is necessary.55 Thus, as 
stated above, the drone program would have to be deemed illegal 
under this approach, because of impermissible targeting practices.  
Finally, if targets of drone strikes are American citizens, 
additional constitutional issues shed further scrutiny on the legality of 
such attacks. Recently, an American citizen, Anwar al-Alwaki was 
52. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 119. 
53. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 29 (1st ed. 2004). 
54. See, e.g., Marco Sassòli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the “War 
on Terrorism,” 22 LAW & INEQ. 195, 208–10 (2004) (arguing no one can 
fall between the protections of civilian status and lawful combatant 
status and thus fail to be protected by either status). 
55. See supra Part II on the applicability of international human rights law 
to the use of drones and targeted killings.  
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targeted and killed in a drone strike in Yemen.56 Many have criticized 
the resort to targeted killings against a U.S. citizen.57 The U.S. 
Constitution entitles all those it protects to due process.58 Attorney 
General Holder stated in his speech in March 2012 that due process 
did not equal judicial process, thereby implying that judicial oversight 
and review was not necessary before the executive ordered the 
targeted killing of an American citizen.59 This view has been heavily 
criticized, and many have lamented that the executive, under this 
view, determines who can be targeted, when and where, with no 
judicial or other oversight.60 Thus, if targets of drone strikes are 
American citizens, the legality of such strikes becomes more dubious 
and less politically and morally acceptable. 
IV. Legality of Drone Strikes Under Jus in Bello? 
The next question raised by the recent use of drones is one of jus 
in bello: is the way in which drones are being used legal? The above 
discussion on the definition of the battlefield and the identity of 
targets raised issues of jus ad bellum, or the lawfulness of the entire 
drone program. If one were to conclude that the program is not per se 
illegal, one would nonetheless have to examine how and under what 
circumstances drones were being used. This issue is one of jus in 
bello.61  
Jus in bello dictates that force may be used only if such use 
respects the principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and 
humanity.62 The principle of military necessity requires that armed 
attacks during wartime be limited to military objectives and offer a 
56. See Al Qaeda’s Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, supra note 19. 
57. See Rebecca Nelson, Targeted Killing of U.S. Citizens Lawful, Says 
Holder, but Critics Pounce, MEDILL NATIONAL SECURITY ZONE, http:// 
nationalsecurityzone.org/site/targeted-killing-of-u-s-citizens-lawful-says-
holder-but-critics-pounce/ (Mar. 19, 2012) (noting the widespread 
criticism of Holder’s asserted legal justifications for targeted killings of 
U.S. citizens). 
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
59. See Holder, supra note 21. 
60. See, e.g., Nathan Freed Wessler, In Targeted Killing Speech, Holder 
Mischaracterizes Debate over Judicial Review, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS, 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/targeted-killing-speech-
holder-mischaracterizes-debate-over-judicial-review(Mar. 5, 2012).  
61. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 6, at 589 (noting the decision to use 
drones is governed by jus ad bellum, but once drones are in use, they are 
governed by jus in bello). 
62. For a detailed discussion of the legality of the use of drones under jus in 
bello, see Vogel, supra note 2, at 114–29. 
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well-defined military advantage.63 Thus, only measures which are 
“indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as 
soon as possible” should be undertaken.64 The principle of 
proportionality requires a complex analysis, “taking into account 
factors such as the military importance or exigency of the target.”65 
Thus, Article 51(5) of Additional Protocol I prohibits “attack[s] which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”66 Article 57, in addition, prohibits military 
planners from launching attacks “which may be expected to cause 
incidental . . . [but excessive] loss[es] . . . in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.”67 The principle of 
distinction requires that parties to a conflict distinguish at all times 
between combatants and civilians, as well as between military and 
civilian objects.68 In addition, this principle protects civilians from all 
attacks, and prohibits indiscriminate attacks.69 However, the principle 
of distinction does not forbid civilian casualties; rather, targeting 
decisions “must avoid civilian casualties that are excessive in relation 
to the anticipated military advantage.”70 In other words, the principle 
of distinction permits targeting of individuals “who commit specific 
acts likely to influence military action.”71 Finally, the principle of 
humanity generally prohibits parties to a conflict from using weapons 
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.72 “The principle of 
humanity may be understood as the capstone of the other 
constraining principles, requiring parties to a conflict to exercise 
restraint when an act would cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering, even it if meets the requirements of necessity, distinction, 
and proportionality.”73  
In sum, under jus in bello, force may be used if the military 
objective sought is necessary, if the suffering caused by the use of 
63. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 52(2). 
64. U.S. ARMY LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 164 (Maj. Keith E. Puls ed., 2005). 
65. W. Michael Reisman, Comment, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 381, 395 (1997). 
66. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51(5)(b). 
67. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii). 
68. Id. art. 48. 
69. Id. art. 51(2)–(4). 
70. Orr, supra note 31, at 748. 
71. Id. at 749. 
72. Protocol I, supra note 38, art. 35(2). 
73. Vogel, supra note 2, at 127–28. 
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force is proportionate to the military objective, if the military 
commander can properly distinguish between military and non-
military targets, and if the military commander has adopted limited 
means of injuring the enemy, which minimize unnecessary suffering. It 
is possible that drones could, under carefully crafted circumstances, 
satisfy the rules of jus in bello. For example, if a military commander 
decided to launch a drone attack against a well-known military target, 
if such a drone attack would advance significant military objectives, if 
the drone attack would not harm civilians to a degree 
disproportionate to the military objective sought, and if the drone 
attack would not cause unnecessary suffering, such a drone attack 
could comply with jus in bello. In fact, the Obama Administration has 
claimed its drone program satisfies all the requirements of jus in bello 
because “targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus 
when force is employed and to avoid broader harm to civilians and 
civilian objects.”74 Due to the secrecy of the CIA-operated drone 
program, this assertion unfortunately remains unverifiable. 
Very few courts have ever dealt with the issue of the legality of 
the use of drones under jus in bello. However, the International Court 
of Justice has struggled with similarly difficult issues in its advisory 
opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons.75 The World 
Court was unable to conclude that the use of nuclear weapons could 
never satisfy the rules of international law.76 Similarly, it would be 
hard to conclude that the use of drones could never satisfy the 
requirements of jus in bello. However, it is likely that many already 
launched drone attacks have failed to fulfill to these requirements, 
and one could only hope that in the future, drone operators consider 
such rules of jus in bello with most careful attention. Because, as 
mentioned above, the drone program appears to be mainly operated 
by the CIA and because very little information is publicly known 
about the details of drone attacks, it is impossible to perform the jus 
in bello analysis in order to assess the legality of particular strikes. 
Media reports as to the number of attacks and number of civilian 
casualties vary, prompting many in the international community to 
call for more accountability on behalf of the Obama Administration. 
74. Koh, supra note 9, at 15. 
75. See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 257 (July 8).    
76. Id. ¶ 95. The ICJ concluded: 
[I]n view of the current state of international law, and of the 
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude 
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would 
be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, 
in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.  
 Id. ¶ 105(E). 
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If the Administration is correct in its assessment that the drone 
program satisfies jus in bello requirements, then it should provide 
more information to the public about the program. Secrecy in this 
context reinforces the sense of illegitimacy.  
V. Location and Identity of Drone Operators 
The final question raised by the drone program has to do with 
drone operators themselves. Some have alleged the United States 
conducts two separate drone programs: one by the military and the 
other by the CIA.77 If drone operators are members of American 
armed forces, then they are lawful combatants who enjoy all the 
protections accorded to such status by the Geneva Conventions.78 
More importantly, perhaps, members of the armed forces are trained 
in the use of force, know when and how force can be used, and are 
subject to disciplinary action if they do not follow such rules.79 CIA 
operatives, on the other hand, are not lawful combatants and do not 
enjoy any Geneva Convention protections; they are either civilians or 
unlawful enemy combatants, as discussed above in the context of the 
status of al-Qaeda members.80 CIA operatives are not trained in the 
use of force and do not face court-martial or other disciplinary action. 
In fact, the CIA drone program has been secret, and no particular 
information regarding the specifics of the program has ever been 
publicly disclosed.81 The identity of the operators may not be 
dispositive of all the legal issues discussed above. However, the 
selection of drone operators as CIA personnel rather than then 
members of U.S. armed forces may reflect a particular political choice 
and may, unfortunately, cast more doubt about the legitimacy and 
lawfulness of the entire drone program.  
Further, the location of drone operators may pose additional 
questions regarding the lawfulness of drone operations. Although the 
CIA program has been largely secret, reports have surfaced that drone 
operators tend to be located in the United States, far away from 
battle fields in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, or Yemen.82 Some 
77. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 3.  
78. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 136 (discussing the obligation of members of 
the armed forces to abide by the laws of war, thus securing law of war 
protections for themselves). 
79. See id.  
80. Vogel, supra note 2, at 134–35. 
81. Id. at 135–36 (noting that regarding CIA operation of drones, “the 
public does not know what rules apply and neither does the enemy, in 
contrast to the military’s requirement for transparency in promulgating 
its rules and regulations”). 
82. Id. at 132. 
212 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
The United States’ Use of Drones in the War on Terror 
have criticized this phenomenon by arguing that warfare has turned 
into a video game, where lethal weapons are launched through the 
click of a button.83 A drone operator tucked away into the safety of 
CIA offices in Nevada or Arizona deploys highly dangerous arms 
which can cause hundreds of deaths in a matter of seconds, without 
any risk to the operator or any of his or her associates.84 As Army 
Chaplain D. Keith Shurtleff has noted, “as wars become safer and 
easier, as soldiers are removed from the horrors of war and see the 
enemy not as humans but as blips on a screen, there is a very real 
danger of losing the deterrent that such horrors provide.”85 The fact 
that war has become dehumanized and human casualties eliminated 
for the drone operator side leads some to question whether war has 
become too easy and whether decisions to engage in lethal operations 
will be taken too lightly.86 Thus, “an obscure . . . computer-human 
status issue” may be emerging in this area;87 possible questions 
include whether a computer can truly make life of death decisions, 
whether the absence of a human in a lethal military operation may 
remove all deterrents to violations of the laws of war, and whether 
human judgment is necessary to exercise restraint in situations of 
armed conflict.  
While jus ad bellum and jus in bello do not contain any particular 
requirements regarding the location of drone operators, it is fair to 
assume that when these rules were drafted, remotely operated 
weapons like drones were not contemplated. Thus, it is arguable that 
while jus ad bellum and jus in bello do not contain prohibitions on the 
use of drones remotely operated from places far away from actual 
conflicts, newly developed weapons like drones may require 
development of better-suited rules of armed conflict for the future. 
Certainly, the use of remotely operated weapons like drones poses 
questions of a moral and humanitarian magnitude, which the rule of 
law should also contemplate in the near future. 
83. See id. at 133 (noting that commentators have compared the operation 
of drones to a video game); Orr, supra note 31, at 735 (noting that 
“‘[p]ilots’ in the United States control the drones using joysticks”). 
84. Orr, supra note 31, at 735 (noting that “an obvious advantage of the 
program is the lack of risk to an on-board pilot”).  
85. P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND 
CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 396 (2009). 
86. See id. (“Otherwise nice and normal people create psychic doubles that 
carry out sometimes terrible acts that their normal identity would never 
do . . . . These weapons don’t just create greater physical distance, but 
also a different sort of psychological distance and disconnection.”).  
87. Vogel, supra note 2, at 136. 
213 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
The United States’ Use of Drones in the War on Terror 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The use of drones to perform targeted killings in remote locations 
of Pakistan and Yemen is riddled with difficult legal questions. These 
questions have been impossible to answer because of the secrecy 
surrounding the CIA drone program. If the United States is truly 
engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
associated forces, it can be argued that drone attacks are not per se 
illegal, and that, if performed under carefully elaborated rules and 
guidelines, they could satisfy the relevant rules of jus in bello. Issues 
that remain unanswered are those regarding the nature of the conflict 
that the United States has been engaged in since 9/11, as well as 
those regarding the details of CIA-led drone operations, without 
which rules of jus in bello cannot be analyzed. The Obama 
Administration, as well as any future administrations, should consider 
installing military-led drone operations, which would be subject to 
public scrutiny to ensure that the rule of law remains the guiding 
principle of U.S. use of force abroad.  
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